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1. Introduction
Human communication often expresses more than what is explicitly said.
To convey and retrieve additional information beyond what is literally
encoded, speakers and hearers exploit certain inferential principles, often
called implicatures. This paper is concerned with one well-known such
case of pragmatic inference, namely scalar implicatures (SIs) with the
quantifier some. Take (1) as an illustration. Though the literal meaning of
the sentence in (1a) is equivalent to (1b), (1a) communicates (1c):
(1)

a. John ate some of the cookies.
b. John ate one or more cookies. (= possibly all)
c. It is not the case that John ate all of the cookies.

Under the traditional Gricean (1975) account, the hearer arrives at (1c), an
SI, using the following line of reasoning. Assuming the speaker of (1a) is
co-operative, she would have uttered a more informative sentence with all
if John had indeed eaten all of the cookies. Since the speaker chose not to
do so, the hearer infers that she is not in a position to offer the stronger
statement, most likely because the stronger statement does not hold. Such
reasoning about alternative sentences that could have been said instead
leads to SIs as in (1c).
Computing implicatures is a multi-step process, which we can generalize
to an algorithm as in (2) (e.g., Sauerland 2004, Katzir 2007):
(2)

Step 1: Compute the literal meaning of a sentence S
John ate some of the cookies. (= one or more, possibly all)
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Step 2: Generate a set of alternatives, ALT(S), by substituting
some with appropriate lexical items of the same category, or
scalemates
{John ate all of the cookies, John ate most of the cookies…}
Step 3: Negate those sentences in ALT(S) that are logically
stronger than S
{¬John ate all of the cookies, ¬John ate most of the cookies…}
Step 4: Strengthen the basic meaning of S by conjoining it with
the negated alternatives in Step 3
{John ate some of the cookies and it is not the case that John ate all of
the cookies…}
Upon hearing a sentence with a scalar term like some, the listener first
calculates the basic or literal meaning of the expression. Next, she must
generate a set of sentences that may have been uttered instead, by
replacing some with its scalemates. Those alternatives in the set, which are
more informative than the original sentence S are then negated, resulting
in the “strengthened” meaning of the utterance (e.g., some, but not all).

2. Developmental work
In order to become competent communicators, children need to be able to
make use of an algorithm as in (2). A number of studies on children’s
scalar implicatures, however, suggest that children under age 6 have
considerable difficulties in this realm (Noveck 2001, Papafragou &
Musolino 2003, Huang & Snedeker 2009, Barner et al. 2011). Preschoolaged children often accept “weak” readings with some when a stronger
statement with all would have been felicitous. For example, in a study by
Papafragou and Musolino (2003), children were shown a scenario with
three horses, all of which jumped over a fence. A puppet then described
the scene using the sentence “Some of the horses jumped over the fence.”
When asked whether the puppet’s statement was a good description of
the situation, adults said “No,” but children responded affirmatively. This
pattern of behavior has been taken to mean that children do not enrich the
meaning of some in the prompted sentence to some, but not all.
Children’s performance improves drastically under certain experimental
manipulations. They are adult-like when given training, or when the task
involves direct comparison of alternatives. In a series of studies by
Chierchia et al. (2001) and Gualmini et al. (2001), children who, in the

classic Truth Value Judgment paradigm, appeared insensitive to the
exclusivity implicature triggered by the disjunctive operator or (i.e. “p or q,
but not p and q”) showed adult-like accuracy in a task that asked them to
compare under-informative/weak sentences and informative sentences.
Two puppets offered statements that differed in strength, and children
were asked to reward the puppet who “said it better”. Children
overwhelmingly rewarded the puppet who uttered the informationally
stronger sentence, revealing their capacity to assess alternatives when they
are explicitly provided. More recently, it has been showed that simply
priming the stronger alternative, e.g., an all statement, in the experiment
context improved performance (Foppolo et al. 2012, Skordos and
Papafragou 2014). When the critical some-trials are preceded by all-trials,
children can draw on this contrast to derive a strengthened some, but not
all meaning.
The above findings tell us that though children do not always calculate
implicatures, the general cognitive machinery necessary for pragmatic
enrichment is in place. So, what is behind their underperformance to
begin with? To put differently, which steps of the algorithm in (2) do
children find difficult? An answer is put forth in Barner, Brooks and Bale
(2011), who argue that the difficulty lies in Step 2 of the algorithm:
children cannot spontaneously generate the alternatives, likely because
they have trouble retrieving the relevant lexical items with which to
replace the relevant scalar term. On the other hand, if the alternatives are
given to them, they successfully compute the strengthened meaning.
Support for this hypothesis comes from findings that children continue to
have trouble even when strengthening is required by the grammar, e.g.
when you have an overt exhaustifier like only. In their experiment, the
authors showed that children accept statements like “Only some of the
animals are sleeping” in contexts where all of the animals were sleeping.
On the other hand, when the relevant animals were individuated, as in
“Only the cat and the dog are sleeping,” they performed at ceiling. The
authors argue that in the latter case, the relevant scalemates (e.g., the cat,
the dog) are readily available to them because it is explicitly listed in the
prompt.
Barner, Brooks and Bale (2011) predict, then, that children should perform
like adults even in SI-tasks when the burden of spontaneous alternativegeneration is removed, that is, when the stronger alternative is available in
the context. The high performance in, e.g., Chierchia et al’s (2001) felicity
judgment task and Foppolo et al.’s (2012) alternative-priming task is

consistent with their hypothesis: in both cases, the relevant alternative
sentence is readily accessible in the context.
The present study further explores the role of accessible alternatives in
children’s performance with scalar implicatures with some. Specifically,
we were interested in whether children benefited from having the
stronger alternative salient in the experimental context, but crucially, not
provided as a linguistic object. We contrasted some, but not all and all by
visually representing the two sets side by side. The child was then asked
to choose the set that best represented a some-sentence. Findings from the
word-learning literature show that even at very young ages, children are
able to consider contrastive alternatives even when they are not verballyencoded (Carey 1978, Markman 1989). We reasoned that the visual
contrast between all and some should point children in the right direction
as to which alternative to generate and negate. Contrary to our
expectations, children did not reliably discriminate between the some, but
not all and all sets until after 6 years of age.

3. Experiment
We asked whether making the some-all contrast salient by depicting all
alongside some, but not all (henceforth some) would improve children’s rate
of SIs. Children were given a four-choice picture selection task, where the
choices were sets in which some, all, none, or some part of the objects
satisfied a given predicate. The prompt always involved some. The
alternative with all, though never explicitly given, is easily construable
from the context. If children benefit from the contextual availability of the
stronger alternative, we should find them performing like adults,
strengthening the prompted sentence and choosing the some set.
3.1. Methods
Our data are part of a large, longitudinal study on cognitive, linguistic
and socio-emotional development (Landry 2010). The study was
conducted over the course of 4 years, with each participant being tested 4
times. Thus, we were able to track the time-course of SI-development on
the same group of children.
3.1.1. Participants
353 children from subsidized schools in Texas and Florida participated in
our study. Testing time 2 took place 8 months after Time 1, Time 3 took

place a year after Time 2, and Time 4, a year after Time 3. Children began
the study when they were 4-years-old (Mean Age at Time 1 = 4.53) and
completed it when they were approximately 7-years-old (Mean Age at
Time 4 = 7.06).
3.1.2. Design and Materials
There were two items with the quantifier some, given in (3). The small
number of critical items was due to time-constraints imposed by the large
battery of tests being run with each child.
(3)

Scalar Implicature items
a. Some cars are red.
b. Some birds are blue.

Children were given a four-choice picture-selection task, as exemplified in
Figure 1 below1. The array included pictures where some, all, none, or parts
of the cars were red.
Figure 1: Picture array in task

Participants were asked to point to the picture where “Some cars are red,”
and instructed to select only one of the 4 sets. We expected that adults in
the task would draw the SI and strengthen “Some cars are red” to “Some
but not all cars are red,” resulting in a selection of the top-right set in
Figure 1. Selecting the some (but not all) picture was therefore considered a
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  These materials were inspired by early work by Roeper and Matthei (1975).

“correct” response in this task. Any other selection was coded as an
“incorrect” response.
3.2. Results
3.2.1. SI-computation over Time
We found that at the earlier stages, children do not consistently choose the
target set, but performance increases steadily over Time. The some-set is
not the predominant choice until Time 3, when the participants are
around 6 years old. The rate of accuracy at each time is given in Table 1:
Table 1: Accuracy by Time

Time
1
2
3
4

Mean Age

Accuracy

4.53
5.06
6.07
7.06

.27
.36
.55
.80

SD
.44
.48
.50
.40

A maximally-specified mixed-effects model confirmed this trend: Time
was a significant predictor of performance on SIs. Our model was
specified such that the accuracy at one time was compared to the accuracy
at the next time: Time 1 is thus compared to Time 2, Time 2 to Time 3, and
Time 3 to Time 4. We find that performance did not change significantly
between Times 1 and 2 (β = 0.29, Odds Ratio = 1.33, p = 0.1). However,
children are significantly more likely to correctly choose the some-set at
Time 3 than they were at Time 2 (β = 1.61, Odds Ratio = 5.02, p < .001), and
much more likely to choose some at Time 4 than at Time 3 (β = 4.11, Odds
Ratio = 61.16, p < .001).
A closer look at the children’s responses reveals that even at the earliest
stage, they know the logical meaning of some: the none and part responses
are rarely selected, as illustrated in Table 2:
Table 2: Children’s Response Types

Time
1
2
3
4

all

none

part

some

54%
48%
30%
12%

7%
6%
4%
2%

12%
11%
11%
6%

27%
36%
55%
80%

In spite of their semantic knowledge of the quantifier, children do not
consistently strengthen the some-sentence to some, but not all. The all-set is
frequently chosen as the best representation of the prompted sentence,
especially by the younger children, who show a preference for the all set.
So, in spite of salient contrast between the some and all, children do not
appear to be calculating an implicatures at the earlier stages.
The behavior of participants in this study is thus reminiscent of children’s
behavior in the early Truth-Value Judgment Tasks (e.g., Noveck 2001).
Our data provide further corroborating, longitudinal evidence in support
of these earlier findings that adult-like, automatic calculation of
implicatures is an ability that develops over time: the same child is more
likely to compute an implicature at age 7 than she was at age 4.
3.2.1. Linguistic & cognitive predictors of SIs
Scalar implicatures are phenomena that sit at the intersection of language
and cognition. On the one hand, implicatures are triggered by specific
lexical items. On the other, they involve a complex reasoning process that
takes into account an array of linguistic and extra-linguistic information.
Thus, the inferential process involved in pragmatic enrichment likely calls
upon linguistic capacities as well as domain-general cognitive machinery.
It is of interest, then, to see whether children’s abilities with other aspects
of language and cognition have an impact on their performance with
scalar implicatures. Since our SI-task was part of a larger study on
linguistic and cognitive development, we were able to investigate
precisely this question.
At Times 1 and 2, measures were also taken of children’s Executive
Functioning ability (“Knock Tap Test”, Korkman, Kirk & Kemp 1998),
Vocabulary (Expressive One Word Picture-Vocabulary test), and syntax (Whquestions subtest on the DELV Language Assessment, Seymour, Roeper &
de Villiers 2005). We conducted analyses on a subset of the data consisting
of these two testing times to see whether these measures predicted
accuracy on the scalar-implicature task. In other words, are children who
are better at inhibitory control or different aspects of language also more
likely to compute implicatures with some?
We specified logistic mixed-effects models with participant and item as
random effects and Time, Executive Functioning, Vocabulary and Whquestions (with the corresponding interaction terms) as fixed effects. The
model revealed no main effect for any of the factors, but it did show a
significant Time*Executive Function interaction (β = 1.36, p=.05) and a

Time*Wh-Question interaction (β = .35, p=.05). At Time 1, there appears to
be little relationship between Executive Functioning or Wh-Questions on
accuracy with scalar implicatures—performance is near-constant
irrespective of ability on either of these measures. However, at Time 2, a
clear trend emerges where children who have higher scores on Executive
Functioning and Wh-questions are also better performers on scalar
implicatures.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the development of scalar implicatures does not
seem to be an isolated phenomenon, but rather, one that interfaces with
the development of other aspects of cognition such as syntax and
executive functioning. The particular patterns of these relationships are
also informative: the lack of effect at Time 1 of either Executive
Functioning or Wh-questions might be indicative of a stage in
development where children simply do not have the resources to make SIrelated calculations, irrespective of their abilities in other domains.

4. Discussion
The present study set out to test whether children can draw implicatures
of the form ‘some ! ¬all’ when an implicit contrast between some and all is
made in the context. We provided longitudinal data on a large sample,
replicating findings that i) 4-year-olds know the logical meaning of some,
but ii) children younger than 6 are happy to accept a some and possibly all
reading in contexts that implicate some, but not all for adults. Although the
trials depicted both all and some (but not all) sets, at the earlier stages, the
all-set was chosen as representing a some-sentence at least as often as the
target some-set. Our findings suggest that the availability of the allalternative in the context did not sufficiently encourage children to
compute a not-all implicature.
Previous studies have shown that children strengthen some-statements
when the contrast with all is explicit, e.g., when they had to directly
compare sentences with some and all or when the critical some-trial was
preceded by an all-trial (Chierchia et al. 2001, Foppolo et al. 2012, Skordos
and Papafragou 2014). Why are they unable to make use of the implicit
contrast between some and all in the present study? One reason might be
that identifying the intended contrast might itself be more challenging in
our task. Compare our picture-selection task with the felicity judgment
task as in Chierchia et al. (2001), where two sentences where evaluated
relative to a single picture. The task itself makes unambiguous that there
is a lexical contrast between the two scalar elements compared. Our task,

on the other hand, involves a single sentence and two semantically
compatible situations or sets. Given that the task calls for the “best possible
choice,” adults infer that a contrast is intended between the two sets that
make the sentence literally true. However, children might not take a
similar step in reasoning, and may even be assuming different criteria
(e.g., a greater number of items satisfying the predicate) for choosing the
best answer.
Secondly, unlike tasks that involved linguistically-encoded alternatives,
our task could not guarantee that upon seeing the array, the child (or
adult) encoded the relevant set using an all-proposition. Upon initial
encounter, one could just as well describe the critical sets in Figure 1 as,
for example, “Three cars are red” and “Five cars are red.” If this is the
case, the contrasts depicted cannot be expected to aid the retrieval of an
alternative sentence with all.
The present study and much of the previous work demonstrate that in
spite of having the cognitive machinery for pragmatic strengthening from
early on, adult-like computation of scalar implicatures is an ability that
continues to develop well into the early primary-school years. Adults
compute implicatures with some by default, canceling the inference only
when the situation demands it. Children, on the other hand, seem to
compute scalar implicatures only when unambiguously required by the
context. Since the communicative contexts are bound to vary with
different experimental materials and methodology, we also expect varying
performance from children. The complex, at times conflicting, set of
findings in the developmental literature is illustrative of precisely this.
Why isn’t computing implicatures a default step for children, as it appears
to be for adults? Prior studies have shown that computing scalar
implicatures comes at a processing cost (e.g., Bott and Noveck 2004,
Breheny, Katsos and Williams 2006). It might be that children, who
arguably have fewer cognitive resources available to them, may prefer not
to incur these costs unless absolutely necessary. This would also be
consistent with our finding that there is a positive link between executive
functioning and the ability to compute implicatures. However, the precise
nature of the differences between adult and child implicature generation
remains an important, open question.

Acknowledgments
We are grateful to Peter de Villiers for extensive help with the data and to
Martin Hackl, Aron Hirsch and Ken Wexler for discussion and generous
feedback.

References
Barner, D., Brooks, N., & Bale, A. (2011). Accessing the unsaid: The role of
scalar alternatives in children’s pragmatic inference. Cognition, 188, 8796.
Bott, L., & Noveck, I., A. (2004). Some utterances are underinformative:
The onset and time course of scalar inferences. Journal of Memory and
Language, 51, 437-457.
Breheny, R., Katsos, N., & Williams, J. (2006). Are Generalised Scalar Implicatures generated by default? An on-line investigation into the role of
context in generating pragmatic inferences. Cognition, 100, 434-463.
Carey, S. (1978). The child as word learner. In J. Bresnan, G. Miller and M.
Halle (eds.), Linguistic Theory and Psychological Reality, 264-293.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Chierchia, G., Crain, S., Guasti, M., T., Gualmini, A., & Meroni L. (2001).
The acquisition of disjunction: Evidence for a grammatical view of
scalar implicatures. Proceedings from the Annual Boston University
Conference on Language Development, 25, 157-168.
Foppolo, F., Guasti, M. T., & Chierchia, G. (2012). Scalar implicatures in
child language: Give children a chance. Language Learning and
Development.
Gualmini, A., Crain, S., Meroni, L., Chierchia, G., & Guasti, M., T. (2001).
At the semantics/pragmatics interface in child language. Proceedings of
Semantics and Linguistic theory XI. Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications,
Department of Linguistics, Cornell University.
Grice, H., P. (1975). Logic and conversation. In P. Cole, and J., L. Morgan
(eds.) Syntax and semantics: Speech acts, Volume 3, 41–58. New York:
Academic Press
Huang, Y. T., & Snedeker, J. (2009). Semantic meaning and pragmatic
interpretation in 5-year-olds: Evidence from real-time spoken language
comprehension. Developmental Psychology, 45 , 1723-1729.
Katzir, R. (2007). Structurally-defined alternatives. Linguistics and
Philosophy 30, 669–690.
Kochanska, G., Murray, K., Jacques, T. Y., Koenig, A. L., & Vandegeest, K.
A. (1996). Inhibitory control in young children and its role in emerging
internalization. Child Development, 67(2), 490-507. doi:10.2307/1131828
Korkman, M., Kirk, U., & Kemp, S. (1998). NEPSY: A developmental

neuropsychological assessment. San Antonio, TX: Psychological
Corporation.
Landry, S. (2010) School Readiness Research Consortium. Enhancing Early
Academic, Social, and Language competencies: Impacts from an
Integrated Pre-K Curriculum. Symposium presented at SRCD, Denver
Markman, E., M. (1989). Categorization and naming in children. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Roeper, T., and Matthei, E. (1975). On the Acquisition of All and Some,
Stanford Papers and Research in Child Language Development, 9, 63-75.
Noveck, I. (2001). When children are more logical than adults:
Experimental investigations of scalar implicatures. Cognition, 78, 165188.
Papafragou, A., & Musolino, J. (2003). Scalar implicatures: Experiments at
the semantics-pragmatics interface. Cognition, 86, 253-282.
Sauerland, U. (2004). Scalar implicatures in complex sentences. Linguistics
and Philosophy, 27, 367-91.
Skordos, D. & Papafragou, A. (2014). Scalar Inferences in 5-year-olds: The
Role of Alternatives. Proceedings from the 38th Annual Boston University
Conference on Language Development. Somerville, MA: Cascadilla Press.

